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Introduction
This report describes an emergency drought mitigation program 
executed by the non-governmental organization (NGO) 
Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Belgium (VSF-Belgium) in Turkana 
District, northwestern Kenya, in early 2005. It consisted of 
purchasing drought-affected goats from pastoralists in the worse 
affected parts of the district and donating them to local schools 
and health centres, where the resulting meat was to be used to 
supplement the diet of students and in-patients. The International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) was invited by VSF-Belgium 
to carry out an independent evaluation study of the intervention 
and to make recommendations for the improvement of future 
destocking programs. The evaluation study forms the core of this 
report.
Turkana District and drought
Turkana is the largest though least developed district in Kenya. 
Bordering Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, the district is classified 
as arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). It covers 77 thousand km2 
and is home to around half a million people.1,2 With less than 
3% of the land suited to growing crops, around two-thirds of 
the population depends on subsistence-oriented nomadic 
pastoralism for their livelihoods. Livestock—goats, sheep, 
camels and donkeys and, in wetter parts, cattle—are also 
central to local social and spiritual life. Some pastoralists who 
used to keep cattle no longer do so having lost them in previous 
droughts, such as the one that occurred in 1980.
It is widely believed that droughts are becoming both more 
frequent and more severe in the region: in recent years, 
droughts have occurred in 1992/93, 1996/97, 1999/2001 and 
2005.3 Formerly, an array of traditional coping strategies were 
used to mitigate their impact, such as trekking to access distant 
water, graze and browse resources and preservation of grazing 
reserves for use only during extreme drought. Over the past 20 
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years or so, the survival of traditional nomadic pastoralism in 
the region has become increasingly threatened as these time-
honoured drought mitigation strategies have been undermined. 
In addition to apparently more frequent and severe droughts, 
increased human population, decreased access to traditional 
rangelands, the spread of an alien invasive plant species 
(Prosopis juliflora) and increased insecurity are all considered 
to be exacerbating factors.
Previous destocking initiatives
There have been a number of previous destocking initiatives 
in Turkana. One of the first was undertaken by the World 
Food Programme (WFP) in 1990 and aimed to improve the 
ecological balance, increase pastoralists’ purchasing power 
and improve food security amongst food insecure pastoralists. 
Agents working for the Kenya Government bought a total of 
2768 sheep and goats at local auction sites and the intention 
was to sell them on to traders with the proceeds contributing 
towards a revolving fund. A subsequent review team identified 
a number of weaknesses in the project’s design: most of the 
animals purchased were emaciated and unhealthy and many 
died before they could be sold on; animals were bought on a 
‘first-come first-served’ basis, which tended to exclude the most 
vulnerable and needy; the price offered, intended to attract only 
the poorest and most desperate livestock pastoralists, proved to 
be high enough to be attractive to both small- and large-scale 
livestock keepers; and the scale of the project was too small to 
have any impact on stocking densities and hence the ‘ecological 
balance’. Whilst the project was clearly not a model destocking 
intervention, it was concluded that destocking constituted a 
legitimate tool for the provision of emergency support directly 
to pastoralists.4,5
VSF-Belgium first became involved in destocking activities in 
Turkana in the year 2000, during a prolonged drought, when 
they won a tender to execute a USD 120 thousand project 
funded by the European Union’s Community Development Trust 
Fund. The objective was to enable pastoralists to salvage some 
capital from their animals by selling them before they died, 
drying the resulting meat and supplying this, along with some 
fresh meat, to vulnerable groups. In the process it was expected 
that this destocking exercise would relieve pressure on water 
and pasture resources. A relatively complicated remuneration 
system was devised which allowed for profit to be taken at 
several stages of the process. However, the project produced 
and distributed less than one-third of the amount of dried meat 
specified in the project proposal, partly because large-scale 
fraud in an associated intervention, which provided subsidies 
to transport livestock out of the district, diverted funds away 
from the destocking intervention. Although there was adequate 
community consultation, participation and involvement in 
the implementation phase of the destocking intervention, this 
was totally lacking in the planning phase. Suggestions made to 
improve future destocking operations included the need for a 
simpler and faster remuneration system and there was a strong 
preference by the beneficiary community for fresh rather than 
dried meat. 
The current intervention: The drought of 2005
A large-scale Drought Response Programme, funded by 
European Union Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), took place 
across nine districts of northern and northeastern Kenya in 2005. 
VSF-Belgium was involved in one component of the program 
which involved a small-scale destocking element in Turkana 
District. In return for livestock treatments, mainly dewormers, 
livestock owners paid in-kind: the resulting 2199 goats received 
by VSF-Belgium were donated to vulnerable school children 
and families in the district.
For Turkana District, several possible additional interventions 
were considered by the District Steering Group (DSG), 
including provision of water and subsidized transportation of 
goats, but eventually it was agreed that a limited destocking 
program, targeted at the parts of the district worst affected by 
the drought, was the only feasible option. The resulting Turkana 
Emergency Livestock Off-take (TELO) intervention was put out 
for competitive tender and VSF-Belgium was selected as the 
implementing agency.
The TELO intervention was carried out in January and 
February of 2005 with the stated overall goal to ‘improve the 
socioeconomic status of the pastoral communities living in 
arid areas of Kenya by creating markets for their livestock and 
improving the nutritional status of identified target populations’. 
The intervention had six specific objectives, which were to:
•	 increase	household	cash	income	among	pastoralists;
•	 reduce	pressure	on	water	and	pasture	resources;
•	 increase	food	security	for	vulnerable	school	children;
•	 improve	utilization	of	assets	with	livestock	owners	gaining	
benefit from vulnerable livestock before the condition of 
the livestock deteriorates beyond the point of selling;
•	 increase	access	to	funds	made	available	to	livestock	
owners for future restocking;
•	 use	the	money	saved	from	school	feeding	programs	for	
school fees and/or other relevant projects for pastoralists’ 
school children.
The intention was that communities and traders would be 
sensitized to the intervention through community barazas 
(local meetings). A team of 336 traders, members of 29 local 
livestock marketing associations, were recruited and were 
expected to use their own money to buy specified numbers 
of ‘drought affected, weak but healthy mature’ goats from 
their owners in target divisions of the district for Kenya shilling 
(KES) 800* per goat. To ensure maximum spread of benefits, it 
was stipulated that only one goat should be bought from each 
owner. The details of purchases were recorded on goat purchase 
forms. The traders were then expected to transport the goats 
* In 2005 the exchange rate was approximately USD 1 = KES 72.
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to specified schools or health centres with in-patients (mostly 
tuberculosis patients undergoing treatment) where they were to 
be slaughtered and the meat used to provide additional protein 
in the diets of students and patients. Details of deliveries to the 
beneficiary institution, including date of slaughter, were to be 
recorded on a second form. On delivery of the completed forms 
to VSF-Belgium, the traders were paid by cheque at the rate of 
KES 1000 per goat, providing a margin of KES 200 per animal 
delivered.
Evaluation of TELO: The Actor Network Theory
VSF-Belgium, as the executing agency for the destocking 
intervention, invited ILRI to carry out an independent study 
to evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness and to make 
recommendations to improve similar interventions in the 
future.
ILRI scientists chose to evaluate the intervention using a 
conceptual framework based on Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
supported by neo-classical economics. ANT was used as a 
retrospective analytical tool: it did not inform the design or 
intervention of the destocking intervention. 
ANT has been used by social scientists for the past 20 years 
to analyse interactions within networks, which are considered 
to be made up of people (actors) and things and concepts 
(known as actants).6,7 It attempts to explain how networks come 
together to act as a whole but recognizes that such networks 
are potentially precarious. ANT is used to explore how actor 
networks get formed, hold themselves together or fall apart. 
It makes a number of assumptions: the actors in a network 
take the shape they do because of their relations with one 
another; nothing lies outside the network of relations; there is 
no difference in the ability of technology, humans, animals, or 
other non-humans to act; and as soon as an actor engages with 
an actor-network, it too is caught up in the web of relations that 
form the network. 
According to ANT, interactions between different actors are 
motivated by a goal, which involves the transference of some 
‘intermediary’ (goats in this case) from actor A to actor B. Both 
actors are inscribed with certain properties which will assist in 
the transference, but these inscriptions also prescribe the ways 
in which the actors are allowed to interact. ANT describes the 
progressive constitution of a network in which both actors and 
actants assume identities, defined during negotiations between 
their representatives, according to the prevailing strategies of 
interaction.  
ANT follows four basic steps: identification of problems and 
driving forces; identification of each actor’s interests; enrolment, 
which involves collective deliberation of the most appropriate 
form of action to take; and mobilization, which consists of trying 
new technological and institutional practices.8
According to ANT, the 2005 destocking intervention primarily 
consisted of the enrolment of both actors (development 
professionals, goat owners, traders, heads of schools) and actants 
(goats, drought, money) in order to achieve the objective. The 
destocking proposal formed the principal tool for guiding the 
destocking activity and, in conjunction with VSF-Belgium staff 
on the ground, for facilitating action at a distance. The proposal 
can be understood as a means of aligning heterogeneous 
elements (the actors and actants) to achieve the goals set out 
within the proposal. However, just because the destocking 
proposal and implementation protocols delineates the role 
of each actor, there is no guarantee that all, if any, actors will 
execute their roles accordingly.
In effect, two possible scenarios exist: the first is that, if properly 
enrolled, all actors and actants will play the role assigned to 
them; the second is that, if improperly enrolled, all, or some, 
actors and actants will deviate from their roles to a greater or 
lesser extent. Depending on the centrality of the actors and 
actants with regard to the success of the intervention, and on the 
extent of deviations, the unfurling of interactions between actors 
and actants will either substantiate the assumptions contained 
within the proposal or undermine them: the intervention will 
succeed or fail.
Methodologically the ANT inspired evaluation used two 
approaches, one based on ‘following the actor’ and the 
second based on examination of written records and other 
documentation.
The first approach involved the use of key informant interviews 
with individuals involved in the initial problem identification 
and the subsequent development and design of the destocking 
intervention, and also with representatives of the institutions 
that benefited by receiving free goats. Focus Group Discussions 
were also conducted with key groups of actors, such as 
pastoralists, livestock traders and members of livestock 
marketing associations, to compare the actual roles they 
played during the intervention with those that were assigned 
to them during the design phase. A stratified sampling frame 
was developed to enable adakars (loose cooperative units of up 
to five independent families, who live and herd their animals 
together and benefit from mutual protection against ngoroko, or 
cattle-raiders) situated within 20 km of a major arterial road to 
be selected on a pseudo-random basis to take part in the Focus 
Group Discussions.
The second approach involved a literature review of other 
destocking operations and close scrutiny of VSF-Belgium’s 
destocking proposal and implementation protocol and of the 
records of 2638 goat purchase transactions and 379 deliveries 
of batches of goats to schools and health centres. The different 
sources of information were compared to validate the accuracy 
of information obtained.
Results of TELO
The TELO intervention had six specific objectives and the results 
are considered below in relation to each in turn. In addition, 
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the results are also considered in relation to the four stages 
of ANT, namely identification of problems and driving forces; 
identification of each agent’s interests; enrolment of the actors 
and actants; and mobilization.
To increase household cash income among pastoralists
The off-take program resulted in the purchase of 6338 drought-
affected goats from 2565 individual owners, an average of 
slightly under 2.5 goats per owner. The price prescribed by VSF-
Belgium for purchase of goats was KES 800 each, representing a 
theoretical total average gain per owner of KES 1984. Assuming 
the prescribed price had been paid in all cases, the total 
purchase price of the 6338 goats would have amounted to KES 
5,070,400.
However, the actual price paid to pastoralists varied. Both 
records kept by the traders and interviews held with pastoralists 
as part of the subsequent evaluation exercise revealed significant 
numbers of cases of underpayment. The records showed that 
nearly 17% of pastoralists had been underpaid. Individual 
pastoralists reported receiving as little as KES 300, less than half 
the amount laid down in VSF-Belgium’s guidelines. Surprisingly, 
the records also show that 130 pastoralists apparently received 
more than the prescribed amount for their goats. In addition, 
a small number of pastoralists in areas where there were no 
traders sold their goats directly to local schools and thereby 
received KES 1000 per animal delivered.
When questioned, some traders admitted that the price actually 
paid depended on individual negotiations. It was also apparent 
that many pastoralists were unaware of the TELO initiative, did 
not know that a price had been fixed, and in any case were 
happy to accept lower amounts for animals they knew would 
soon die and for which there was no alternative market.
The traders were also, in most cases, pastoralists. The TELO 
intervention documents prescribed that traders should purchase 
goats for KES 800 and that they would receive KES 1000 on 
proof of delivery to the beneficiary institution. A total of 336 
traders took part in the off-take program, so on average each 
trader bought 19 goats. Assuming the recommended purchase 
price was paid and no goats died between time of purchase and 
delivery to the schools and health centres, each trader would 
on average make a gross profit of close to KES 3800. Making 
the same assumptions, the total profit earned by all 336 traders 
would have amounted to KES 1,267,600.
The actual number of goats purchased by individual traders 
varied. In the northwestern zone of the district, the average was 
42 and in the central zone 10 per trader. This may have been 
because there are more traders in the central zone and less in 
more remote areas, distant from Lodwar (the district capital), 
such as the northwest.
The traders were paid by cheque on delivery to VSF-Belgium 
of completed forms showing the goats had been delivered to 
the schools. This had several impacts on the traders’ net profit. 
There was inevitably a delay, often of around 20 days, between 
purchasing goats, delivering them to the schools and having the 
completed forms available for submission. Since the traders had 
to use their own money to buy the goats, this represented capital 
that was tied up for much longer than normal. The traders were 
expected to buy ‘weak, drought-affected but healthy mature 
goats’ and some traders experienced deaths amongst their 
animals between purchase and delivery; no compensation was 
paid in these cases and the full loss was borne by the trader. 
Finally, traders had to pay bank charges of between KES 100 
and 400 to cash their cheques and they had to travel to major 
towns to do so, resulting in transport and board and lodging 
costs of up to a further KES 800 each. Some traders therefore 
ended up paying almost a third of their gross profit to cash their 
cheques and some even claimed to have lost money as a result 
of taking part in the off-take program.
A potentially longer-term benefit from the intervention in relation 
to increasing household cash incomes was that attendance 
at livestock markets increased during and in the months 
immediately after the destocking program. More pastoralists 
began selling their animals in the open market and new traders 
joined their local Livestock Market Associations and started to 
do business.
To reduce pressure on water and pasture resources
Prior to the intervention, the DSG’s technical support group, 
made up of professionals from the district administration, 
NGOs and the private sector, recommended that the destocking 
program should target 10% of the goat population in those areas 
worst hit by the drought. However, the available funds did not 
allow this and the TELO intervention resulted in the purchase 
and presumed slaughter of 6338 goats.
This off-take is equivalent to about a third of one percent of 
the district’s total goat population, estimated to be 1,956,200. 
The district’s livestock population also consists of an estimated 
140,800 camels, 193,600 cattle, 32,600 donkeys and 975,600 
sheep. Expressed as Tropical Livestock Units, which is a 
convenient method of comparing livestock of different sizes, 
the destocking exercise accounted for just one-tenth of one 
percent of the total district livestock population. The scale of the 
operation is therefore very unlikely to have had any impact on 
water or pasture resources at the district-wide level, although 
it may have had some impact at local levels. A key assumption 
made by the intervention’s designers was that the weak goats 
purchased would have otherwise died, in which case it could 
be argued that they would have been naturally ‘destocked’ 
without any external intervention.
To increase food security for vulnerable school children
The goats purchased during the destocking intervention were 
delivered to 90 institutions, 84 primary and secondary schools 
where the vast majority of the students were boarders, and 
six health facilities that had in-patients, mostly tuberculosis 
patients undergoing the lengthy treatment protocol necessary 
with this disease. Assuming each goat yielded 8 kg of meat, the 
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total amount of meat made available to the institutions was a 
little over 50 thousand kg. A TELO report suggested that 35,197 
‘very poor and poor’ students and 327 in-patients benefited by 
receiving fresh meat; this is equivalent to around 1.4 kg of meat 
per beneficiary.
All institutions questioned reported that, as a result of the 
intervention, the amount of animal protein in the students’ or 
patients’ diets increased. The vast majority of schools reported 
that their boarding students normally received meat meals 
several times a week, often on Monday, Wednesday and Friday 
evenings, which supplemented largely cereal-based diets 
supplied through the on-going World Food Progamme’s School 
Feeding Programme. However the amount of meat offered was 
small—in one school approximately 64 grams per serving. The 
number of meat meals served was increased whilst the free goats 
were available; for example, several schools reported increasing 
the number of meat meals from three to five per week; another 
reported that, whilst it usually bought 28 kg of goat meat a 
week, during the intervention it received 30–35 kg weekly.
The guidelines for the intervention stated that traders would 
only be paid on submission of completed documentation. This 
included a form signed by the head of the beneficiary institution 
confirming that the correct number of goats had been received 
and that these had been slaughtered. In fact, less than half of 
the submitted forms included slaughter dates and some forms 
contained dates that were very hard to believe, for example, 
in some cases the slaughter date was prior to the date the 
goats were delivered to the institution; in other cases the forms 
suggested that large numbers of goats, 88 in one instance, were 
all slaughtered on the same day.
Goats were delivered to beneficiary institutions over a period 
of three to four weeks, although some extended the period over 
which the free meat was enjoyed by keeping the goats for up 
to two and a half months. In some cases the supply of meat 
exceeded the capacity of the recipient institution to consume it: 
one school reported that it gave away two of the seven goats it 
received daily for two weeks to the local health centre. 
It is noteworthy that in most cases only boarding students 
benefited from free meat. Most day schools (of which there were 
reported to be relatively few due to the nomadic lifestyle of 
pastoralists) were excluded and in mixed day/boarding schools, 
only the boarders received the free meat. Head teachers 
observed that most day students were very rarely provided 
with meat in their diets by their families, unlike boarders who 
already regularly received meat meals. It could be argued that, 
by targeting boarders, the most ‘vulnerable school children’ 
mentioned in this objective, i.e. day students, failed to benefit 
from improved food security.
To improve utilisation of assets with livestock owners gaining 
benefit from vulnerable livestock before the condition of the 
livestock deteriorates beyond the point of selling
The off-take intervention targeted weak, drought-affected, 
healthy, mature goats, and the assumption was made that 
otherwise these goats would soon die, in which case the 
pastoralists’ only recourse would be to eat what little meat 
remained on the emaciated carcass. The intervention provided 
an attractive alternative: the offer of payment of KES 800 per 
goat. Generally, traders would not consider buying goats in 
such condition and in the rare situation where there was a 
willing buyer it was estimated that the price on offer would 
be just KES 200 per goat. The intervention price therefore was 
around four-times the ‘market’ price—although in most cases 
no market existed.
In addition to meat, two by-products became available when 
the goats were slaughtered: skins and offal. The project proposal 
specified that the skins should be collected by Local Off-take 
Community Committees, who were expected to sell them and 
use the proceeds for ‘community activities’. In the event, the 
skins were sold by the beneficiary institutions and the proceeds 
reportedly used to buy a variety of inputs, such as salt, other 
kitchen items, examination papers, unspecified ‘essential items’, 
and in at least one case to pay the shepherd employed to look 
after the goats from the time they were delivered until they were 
finally slaughtered.
The fate of goat offal was largely unknown. Some intestines were 
condemned as unfit for human consumption by local authority 
meat inspectors or community animal health workers and in 
other cases they were given to shepherds, goat skinners and 
perhaps slaughterers in payment for services rendered.
To increase access to funds made available to livestock owners 
for future restocking
Without the intervention, the weak goats targeted would 
eventually die in which case the pastoralists’ only option would 
be to eat the resulting meat. Many of the pastoralists interviewed 
as part of the intervention’s evaluation process were unwilling 
to specify how they spent the money they received from 
selling their drought-affected goats. Some, however, reported 
buying maize meal and in one location, Kerio, the pastoralists 
insisted they had used the proceeds to restock when the long-
rains arrived: KES 1000 was said to be enough to buy ‘two 
replacement goats’.
The project proposal specified that only one goat should be 
purchased from each household, although in fact in most cases 
this rule was ignored. Whilst the ‘one goat’ rule was intended 
to ensure wide distribution of benefits to as many pastoralists as 
possible, since the price paid for one weak goat is likely to be 
less than the amount of money needed to buy a replacement 
female breeding animal, this could be regarded as an inherent 
weakness of the project design.
To use the money saved from school feeding program for 
school fees and/or other relevant projects for pastoralists’ 
schools children
This objective arguably conflicts with the earlier one, ‘to increase 
food security for vulnerable school children’, as it implies that the 
goat meat will be used to substitute for rather than supplement 
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any meat that would normally have been made available. All 
the institutions questioned during the evaluation reported saving 
money through not having to purchase the usual quantities of 
goat meat for the duration of the intervention, which varied 
from around three weeks to two and a half months, confirming 
that the meat was used, at least to some extent, to substitute for 
meat that would have been bought anyway.
The amount of money saved was eroded by hidden costs 
associated with the intervention that had, apparently, not been 
foreseen. These included the cost of hiring shepherds to look 
after the goats until they were slaughtered, probably slaughter 
fees, although no institute heads actually mentioned these during 
interviews, and in some cases the cost of purchased feeds.
The schools reported using the savings for a range of purposes: 
paying for a night guard, buying salt, paraffin lamps, unspecified 
‘essential items’ and, in one case—as specified in the project 
proposal—for the purchase of uniforms and bags for needy 
students.
Results in relation to the four stages of ANT
Identification of problems and driving forces
All stakeholders, including local experts and pastoralists, 
recognized that drought was the major problem and that this 
impacted on livelihoods by causing lack of water, grazing and 
browse, thereby severely limiting the productivity of pastoralists’ 
livestock. However, community members were not formally 
involved in the problem identification or project design. 
A key driving force in the development of the TELO intervention 
was provision of financial resources, made available by the 
World Bank through the Kenya Government’s Arid Lands 
Resource Management Project (ALRMP). A total of KES 9 million 
(USD 125 thousand) was made available for the destocking 
intervention.
Identification of each agent’s interests 
The principal agents (or actors) involved in the intervention 
were local development professionals, pastoralists, goat traders, 
heads and members of institutions who received free goats 
and VSF-Belgium. The respective roles and the objective of 
the intervention were explained during a series of community 
dialogue meetings held in all 29 designated buying centres.
During these meetings, 108 Local Off-take Community 
Committees were elected who assumed responsibility to 
‘ensure pastoralists and their children benefited’. However, 
during the subsequent evaluation exercise it emerged that only 
a small number of pastoralists had actually been briefed through 
these meetings. Not all adakars were represented and those 
who attended did not always relay information to their fellow 
pastoralists. Some pastoralists learned about the intervention 
from traders or schools, while others sold their animals to 
traders without being aware of the intervention that made this 
possible. 
Enrolment
In the context of ANT, successful enrolment of actors and actants 
is considered to include collective deliberation of the most 
appropriate form of activity. In the case of TELO, it was apparent 
that there was very good involvement of key development and 
emergency intervention actors in the design of the intervention, 
and even more peripheral actors, such as district public health 
officers, were successfully enrolled. However, there was no 
evidence of community level involvement: pastoralists, traders 
and heads of schools and health centres were simply assigned 
roles. At no point in the design, implementation or subsequent 
evaluation were the primary beneficiaries of the distribution of 
free goats—school boarders and in-patients—consulted.
Mobilization
The final stage of ANT involves operationalizing the intervention. 
As noted above, many key actors were simply expected to 
perform their assigned roles and many pastoralists remained 
oblivious both to the intervention and to the role they were 
expected to play.
It is apparent that the rules of the game, specified by VSF-
Belgium and intended to be strictly followed, were very 
commonly flouted. Examples include: variations in the price 
paid by traders for goats; more than one goat purchased from 
the same owner; delivery of unhealthy goats, some not fit for 
human consumption, to recipient institutions; incomplete and 
inaccurate documentation being submitted by traders to VSF-
Belgium. The scale of the latter problem was great. For more 
than half the goats delivered to school and health centres no 
slaughter date was provided and in numerous other cases 
information provided was clearly incorrect. The possibility of 
fraudulent behaviour by various actors cannot be excluded. In 
some cases, however, confusion rather than fraud is probably 
to blame. During the evaluation exercise some traders reported 
that they understood they were to purchase only ‘female thin 
goats’. Many traders justified negotiating lower prices with 
pastoralists due to the risk of weak goats dying before they could 
be delivered to the designated schools and health centres.
Other issues and constraints
It is noteworthy that the rules of the destocking intervention, 
i.e. price fixed by external actors, was contrary to another VSF-
Belgium intervention. This second intervention was concerned 
with promoting greater market-orientation amongst the district’s 
pastoralists and was based on the normal market arrangement 
whereby buyers and sellers negotiate to settle on a mutually 
acceptable price. The ILRI team also argued that the principle 
of offering pastoralists an intervention price that was higher 
than the market price undermines the goal of institutionalizing 
‘timely sales to the market’ as a coping strategy by pastoralists. 
To promote timely livestock sales to the market, market prices 
need to be more rewarding than intervention prices for weak 
goats that have suffered the drought for several weeks. Having 
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been exposed to such an intervention in the past, goat owners 
faced with a future drought may speculate by awaiting a 
possible intervention—rather than timely selling their goats to 
the market.
Although the intention of the intervention was to target benefits 
to the most needy, a number of biases may have reduced the 
accuracy of this targeting. Pastoralists reported that goats were 
purchased on a ‘first-come first served’ basis, which tended 
to benefit those who lived closest to markets and those with 
the best informant networks. In both cases this would tend to 
favour the less poor. In some cases poorer pastoralists living in 
more remote areas learned of the intervention too late—having 
trekked their weak goats to market in the expectation of selling 
them for KES 800 they were obliged to trek them back home. 
Some traders admitted targeting adakars that were close to 
boreholes or main roads, which again would tend to favour the 
less poor.
Traders had to purchase goats with their own money. They were 
reimbursed by cheque up to 20 days later—which meant their 
capital was tied up for longer than usual—and they then had to 
pay for expenses associated with cashing their cheques. Many 
Livestock Marketing Association members had little money 
and therefore were unable to take part in the intervention; 
again this would tend to exclude the poorer members. Focus 
Group Discussions revealed that key members of the Livestock 
Marketing Associations were reported to have captured the 
lion’s share of the benefits of the destocking intervention.
Students attending local boarding schools were the primary 
beneficiaries of the free goat meat. With a few exceptions, local 
day schools did not benefit and, at schools which had both day 
students and boarders, only the latter benefited. It is likely that 
the poorest students attend day schools, which at primary level 
are free, and therefore those who benefited from the intervention 
were students from less poor families.
The intervention offered a price above the market price for weak 
drought-affected goats and the evaluation team considered what 
impact this might have had on the market price for other grades 
of goats. They concluded that the intervention had no impact, 
since in general there was no market for goats in such poor 
condition; in effect the intervention created a parallel market. 
One perverse consequence of the creation of this parallel 
market was that some pastoralists perceived that the intervention 
constituted a ‘demand’ for their weak animals. Whilst normally 
they had no expectation of selling such animals, or if they did 
would be content to accept a low price, since the intervention 
was actively seeking their animals they reasoned that they were 
entitled to a fair price, which they defined as KES 900 to 1000.
Another consequence of the intervention was the effect it had 
on both enrolment and attendance at local schools. Head 
teachers of boarding schools suggested that enrolment at their 
schools increased during the period when the free meat was 
made available, with pupils defecting from local day schools, 
but this effect was noted to be transient. The head teachers 
also reported that attendance during the intervention was 
exceptionally high.
The TELO intervention received USD 125 thousand in funding 
from the World Bank. The direct benefits received by the 
pastoralists and traders amounted to more than USD 88 thousand. 
By this admittedly crude measure, the intervention transferred 
more than 70% of the project funds to local pastoralists in direct 
cash payments.
Recommendations for improvement  
of future destocking programs
Focus Group Discussions were held with representatives of 
pastoralists and traders and interviews held with heads of the 
institutions that received free goats, during which suggestions 
were made as to how future destocking operations could be 
improved. In addition, LRI scientists who carried out the 
evaluation exercise also made a series of recommendations for 
similar programs in the future.
Both pastoralist goat owners and traders considered that the 
destocking operation was a good approach to drought mitigation. 
The pastoralists suggested that a higher price should be paid for 
animals; that animals should be purchased on a single day; that 
it would be more equitable if they sold their animals directly to 
VSF-Belgium; that 75% of weak animals should be destocked; 
and that other species, such as camels and cattle, should also 
be considered for off-take.
The traders suggested that a higher price be paid and a larger 
margin allowed or that the price should be negotiated freely 
with sellers; larger numbers of animals should be allocated 
to each trader; the program should be extended over a longer 
period, such as throughout the duration of the drought; and that 
payments should be made in cash, not by cheque, to avoid the 
expense associated with cashing the latter.
The heads of institutions that received free goats suggested that 
the activity should be spread over a longer period of time; that 
only healthy goats should be supplied; that the animals should 
be kept at a central holding area until the school was ready 
to slaughter; and that day schools should be included in the 
program.
The ILRI scientists made a series of detailed suggestions for future 
destocking interventions. These included the recommendation 
that, in conjunction with executive implementing agencies, 
local crisis committees should play a proactive role in the 
identification of free goat meat beneficiaries. Whilst schools 
and health centres should remain key beneficiaries of future 
destocking interventions, it was also recommended that local 
crisis committees and the executive implementing agencies 
should also consider providing free goat meat, and/or other key 
necessities, to the most vulnerable households, identified by the 
local crisis committees. On the spot slaughtering of goats at the 
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adakar level and the distribution of free goat carcases to the 
most vulnerable households in the area would circumvent the 
constraints of caring for goats and transporting/trekking them to 
recipient institutions.
For schools, it was suggested that a higher nutritional impact 
could be achieved by targeting the day schools first, as these 
students do not usually have meat in their diets. Only after all 
day schools have been reached should boarding schools be 
considered. In conjunction with school heads and health centre 
managers, the crisis committees should also play an active role in 
devising the logistics of free goat meat deliveries in a transparent, 
verifiable and participatory manner. For example, it is essential 
that systems should be developed and strictly applied to better 
match free goat supply to consumption demand; ensure that 
free goat meat supplements, not just substitutes, usual animal 
protein intake; and adequately address the need for a holding 
area for goats and costs associated with feeding and caring for 
them. It was also suggested that goat skins should be sold by 
recipient institutions.
In addition, it was suggested that it is important that 
verification protocols in future destocking interventions are 
both comprehensive and are rigorously adhered to. Recipient 
institutions should provide verifiable accounts and explain how 
savings made due to suspension of usual goat meat purchases 
and income from goat skin sales were used. It was also 
considered to be imperative that clear and accurate records are 
kept for the number, condition, timing and slaughter of goats 
received, as well as verifiable details of their consumption. A 
system should also be devised for verifying school children’s 
additional consumption of goat meat.
With regard to including the most vulnerable pastoralist 
households as beneficiaries in future destocking interventions, 
it was recommended that executive implementing agencies 
consider adopting a two-tier system. In this system, relatively 
less vulnerable households, with larger livestock holdings, 
would be encouraged to actively destock and receive salvage 
payments for their goats. Conversely, the most vulnerable 
households would become net recipients of free goat meat 
or key necessities. However, it would be important to couch 
this kind of intervention in efforts to promote, where possible, 
livelihood diversification for the most vulnerable households. 
In some cases, where better livelihood options exist, destocking 
could be used as part of a strategy for pastoralists to transit from 
pastoralism to other, more rewarding and sustainable livelihood 
activities.
In view of VSF-Belgium efforts to develop livestock markets and 
promote greater market-orientation of pastoralists in Turkana, 
the pricing of goats during a destocking intervention deserves 
more considered thought. It was not considered advisable to pay 
a higher than market price for weak goats, as this undermines 
the institutionalization of timely sales of livestock to market as 
a recognized drought coping strategy for pastoralists. Rather it 
was suggested that a reasonable salvage value is paid, e.g. KES 
300, or anything below the lowest market price paid for the 
lowest grade of goats normally traded at conventional livestock 
markets. This would still serve as a safety net for those that did 
not sell in time, while not rewarding them for not having sold 
earlier in local markets. Conversely, once pastoralists become 
accustomed to selling their goats, they will be rewarded for 
doing so in a timely manner at the local markets. If goats were 
to be destocked at a lower price this would enable far more 
goats to be purchased during an emergency intervention and 
more meat would become available as relief food.
Another scale consideration is on the demand side: the more 
goats being destocked, the more vulnerable households or 
other beneficiaries would need to be identified. This, however, 
should not be the largest constraint as from TELO 2005 there is 
experience in working with schools and health institutions and 
these could always serve as a back-up plan. However, using 
those institutions will need some more thought in terms of the 
timing of deliveries and keeping of large numbers of goats. Also 
schools expressed the wish to receive goats over a longer period 
of time. But postponing the purchase of goats would affect 
their quality and disadvantage their owners, while temporarily 
keeping goats involves extra costs and does not reduce the 
pressure on water and pastures unless imported feeds are made 
available, which is an expensive option. Slaughtering goats on 
the spot—at adakar level—and redistributing the carcasses to 
nearby vulnerable households circumvents the whole transport 
constraints of providing goats to institutions.
The forms used during the TELO initiative need to be improved. 
The Turkana Emergency Livestock Off-take monitoring forms 
should be split into two different parts. One, to monitor the 
deliveries of goats to the institutes. Once the Livestock Marketing 
Association representative, LOCC official and the institute’s 
representative have signed, the trader could proceed to receive 
his payment. A second form would be used to document the 
slaughtering of goats, which then could be recorded at any time 
after the delivery date (not under time pressure to close the books 
so the trader could be reimbursed). The slaughtering form could 
be complemented with a section in which the institute accounts 
for the use of the income from the goat skins, and/or other funds 
saved on meat purchases. Meanwhile the ‘goat purchasing 
forms’ could be improved by adding the dates of purchase for 
each transaction; the date of delivery to the schools; and adding 
the location of the adakar at the time of purchase.
Conclusion
Overall, the ILRI evaluation team considered that the intervention 
was a success: more than USD 88 thousand in cash benefits 
was distributed directly to the district’s pastoralist community 
and 50 thousand kg of meat made available to local schools 
and health centres. There was, however, room for improvement 
in a number of key areas especially through active community 
participation in the design phase; better targeting of benefits 
to reach the most vulnerable; and better record keeping and 
greater accountability. There were also some unanticipated 
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negative consequences, such as hidden costs that had to be 
met by the recipients of goats and potential conflict with the 
objective of other initiatives in the district, such as promotion of 
greater market integration by pastoralists. The recommendations 
made by both the community members and the evaluation 
team could usefully inform the design and execution of any 
future destocking intervention. Several of these, however, 
reflect recommendations (such as the need to include local 
communities in the planning phase, the problem of weak 
animals dying before they could be utilized, a first-come-first-
served approach to purchasing animals for destocking and the 
scale of the intervention being too small to have an impact on 
water and feed resources) made during post-mortems of previous 
destocking exercises undertaken up to 15 years earlier.
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